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Is quantum mechanics creationism, and not science?
Werner A. Hofer∗
School of Natural and Environmental Sciences, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 7RU, UK
I revisit the Bohr-Einstein controversy of 1935. Bohr’s assertion that there are no causes in atomic
scale systems is, as a closer analysis reveals, not in line with the Copenhagen interpretation since it
would contain a statement about reality. What Bohr should have written is that there are no causes
in mathematics, which is universally acknowledged. The law of causality requires physical effects
to be due to physical causes. For this reason any theoretical model which replaces physical causes
by mathematical objects is creationism, that is, it creates physical objects out of mathematical
elements. I show that this is the case for most of quantum mechanics.
I. A DIFFERENT KIND OF RESEARCH
This article, which covers the last two years of my re-
search, did not result from the usual working practices of
a theoretical physicist. Such practices typically involve
the scribbling of mathematical symbols on a whiteboard
or a piece of paper, the rearranging and replacing of these
symbols and their evolution until a final set of symbols is
reached which seems to make sense and can then be put
between the text lines in a scientific article.
This research evolved more or less out of a deep medi-
tation on a few words in Bohr’s original paper from 1935,
where he tried to prove Einstein wrong, who had accused
quantum mechanics of being incomplete [1, 2]. The seven
words in question are ’renunciation of the classical ideal
of causality’, and it took me quite some time to make
sense of them. Renunciation to me sounded ominous,
and it is perhaps no coincidence that an emissary of the
Pope is a Nuntius, which could explain my slight trep-
idation, since I was raised a Catholic. The other two
words which took a long time to settle in my thinking
were ’classical’ and ’ideal’. It was not immediately clear
to me what these two words had to do with causality.
In fact, the more I meditated on them, the less sense
they made. In my understanding, which had been philo-
sophically trained on Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche,
causality was due to the fact that events happened in
space and time and that one event could cause a subse-
quent one. What this had to do with ’classical’, which
I understand to mean, in music, the period from about
Haendel to Beethoven, was not obvious. If the ’classical’
posed problems, it became even worse for the ’ideal’, be-
cause since when were causes conditioned by something
’ideal’? Things happen, because something causes them,
which seems to be pretty much accepted across all disci-
plines in science and engineering. Why this should pose
a problem for atomic physics, remained a mystery.
That is, it remained a mystery, until I began looking for
causes in atomic physics and did not find any. The theory
describing it only took you so far with causes, and at this
point it all became mathematics. Call me suspicious,
but this is exactly what a magician would do: he would
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lure you into a comfortable feeling telling you how he
progresses with his magic trick, until at some point the
trick is done and you don’t know how it happened. This
was, more or less, the case in all events in atomic physics
I analysed. But as a consequence I did not, like most of
my colleagues did over the years, sigh and get on with my
mathematical calculations [3], but started to ask: Why
are there no causes in atomic physics? and What causes
physical effects in atomic physics? It took me quite some
time to find simple answers to these two questions.
The answers, and the whole story how physics came
to lose its causes are written down in a popular science
book, which is about to be published [4]. However, I
thought that my colleagues, and those too busy to read
a reasonably priced book of 300 pages, might appreciate
a free and much shorter executive summary. This is what
the rest of the article delivers.
II. MATHEMATICS AND OTHER LANGUAGES
There are two famous statements about the relation-
ship of mathematics and reality. The first is from Galileo
Galilei, when he said that ”Nature is written in the lan-
guage of mathematics”[5]. His statement is based on the
acceleration of mass in gravity fields and the observa-
tion that acceleration is constant and that the path a
mass covers is proportional to the time interval squared.
This, of course, is described very accurately in the laws of
classical mechanics, developed by Newton after Galilei’s
death. One can interpret the statement in two possible
ways. The first would be that mathematics is a language
like any other. The difference being that it is not organ-
ised along the laws of a particular grammar, which gov-
ern languages, but according to the laws of logic, which
govern mathematics. In principle, however, there is no
difference between mathematics or any other language.
The other interpretation would be that mathematics has
a special relationship with Nature. This interpretation,
as will be seen, has led to some confusion in the scientific
community, as it often is taken to mean that mathemat-
ics somehow provides a closer match with reality than
other languages could.
Fortunately for scientists in the 21st century, not even
mathematicians claim that their mathematical objects
2are physical objects in real space, possibly with one ex-
ception, see below. If any mathematician would make
this claim, then she would have to explain why, for ex-
ample, nobody has ever seen a perfect triangle float in
space. So it is fairly safe to assume that mathematics is
a particular form of language.
This has been the topic of a heated debate in the mid-
dle ages which has, at the beginning of the modern age,
led to a clear solution. The debate in the middle ages was
between factions which were then called the ’realists’ and
the ’nominalists’. Realists believed that the elements of
language were real. So they searched, quite understand-
ably, for the original language, the one that would reflect
Nature closest, which they thought might have been the
language Adam and Eve spoke in paradise. In their view,
elements of this original language are real, and they ex-
ist in the real space of our everyday life. Realists traced
their belief back to the Greek philosopher Plato. Nomi-
nalists, on the other hand, did not believe that language
was real. For them the elements of a language were a
social construct and due to a common agreement about
their exact meaning. This faction can be traced back to
William of Ockham, of Occam’s razor fame.
Nominalism is the common principle agreed by modern
science in the 17th century. Language, according to this
agreement, is a social construct to enable communication
between humans and does not exist in reality. Mathemat-
ics, according to this understanding, is also not part of
reality.
This consensus has been violated by physics in the 20th
century. Initially, this was probably clearest expressed
by Eugene Wigner when he said that: ”The first point
is that the enormous usefulness of mathematics in the
natural sciences is something bordering on the mysteri-
ous and there is no natural explanation for it. Second, it
is just this uncanny usefulness of mathematical concepts
that raises the question of the uniqueness of our physi-
cal theories”[6]. The two points Wigner raised are very
profound. Because it is indeed the question why ready-
made mathematical concepts like Riemann geometries,
Hilbert spaces, Hermitian matrices, Lie algebras and the
like would be useful to describe reality in physics.
It will be seen in the following sections that the reason
for this feature of physics, in particular quantum mechan-
ics, is that it is largely devoid of causality and ascribes the
ability to have physical effects to elements of the mathe-
matical language. The belief that mathematical objects,
which do not exist in real space, can cause physical effects
in the real world, is very similar to the belief that a God,
who does not exist in the real world, created this world.
Philosophically, there is no difference between a Bible-
belt Christian, who wishes fire and brimstones onto the
infidels, and a University quantum theorist, who wishes
mathematical symbols to change reality: they are both,
at heart, creationists.
Let me finish this section with a quote fromMIT physi-
cist Max Tegmark, who seems to have completely lost
the ability to differentiate between a language describing
Nature and Nature herself. Tegmark’s main contribution
to the debate is the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis
(MUH), which says that ”Our external physical reality
is a mathematical structure”[7]. Interestingly, his argu-
ment is based on the assumption that there exists an
external physical reality independent of us humans. The
present article is based on exactly the same assumption.
Unfortunately, Tegmark’s hypothesis that the objects of
mathematics are in fact objects in the real world is ex-
actly the same as the assumption of medieval realists.
This hypothesis does not agree with the nominalist view,
which is the basis of modern science. Linguists will prob-
ably also have a word to say about such an idea.
The point to remember from this section is that lan-
guage is a description of Nature or reality, which in itself
has no reality and depends on common consent. Mathe-
matics, it should also be remembered, is only one partic-
ular kind of language.
III. THE CASE AGAINST BOHR
To an unbiased observer, a mechanical engineer, say,
or a sociologist, it must seem strange that there exists
a distinct difference between experiments and theory in
modern physics. While experiments at the atomic scale
have improved and the precision and abilities to manip-
ulate systems reached dizzying heights which really seem
to allow us to create new materials and new structures
from the bottom up, theory seems to be stuck in a time
warp, which always reverts back to the 1930s. A histo-
rian would probably conclude that something happened
in the 1930s, which theoretical physics still has problems
to overcome. It is hard to overlook the similarities in the
political sphere where, for example, the members of the
Orange Order in Northern Ireland still march on the 12th
of July every year to reassure themselves by a commemo-
ration of the Battle of the Boyne, which happened in 1690
[8]. The reason for this, I would suggest, is the contro-
versy between Einstein and Bohr, and the fact that this
controversy transformed theoretical physics from a tool
to describe reality by mathematical means to an ideol-
ogy, which henceforth sought by every means possible to
police the opinion that there is no mathematical theory
beyond quantum mechanics. Here is, what happened.
We shall come to the case against wavefunctions in the
next section, but wavefunctions, by about 1930, became
a problem for the logical analysis of events at the atomic
scale. Einstein, with his colleagues Podolsky and Rosen,
pointed this out in an article in 1935 [1]. The following is
a slightly simplified description of the measurements and
processes Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) consid-
ered. They assumed that two electrons are emitted from
an atom in two opposite directions at very high speed.
They still retain their common wavefunction as they fly
along. Their wavefunction has one component, which is
spin-up and one component, which is spin-down. But
since these two electrons still have a common wavefunc-
3tion, we do not know, which electron is spin-up and which
electron is spin-down. To find out, we position magnets
in the path of the electrons, at equal distance from the
atom, which measure their spin. Magnet A, along the
right path at a very large distance from the atom emit-
ting the electrons. And there is magnet B, along the left
path also at a very large distance. As magnet A measures
the spin of the electron, it is observed that the electron
is pushed upwards: this, says a physicist observing the
result, is proof that the spin state of the electron arrived
at A is spin-up. But here comes the rub: since the two
electrons together have zero spin, the spin of the electron
measured at magnet B must be spin-down. The physicist
at magnet A could either measure the spin or not. If she
does not, then her colleague measuring at B could obtain
both results, either spin-up or spin-down. If she does,
then her colleague can only measure the opposite spin to
the one measured at A. So clearly, the measurement at
magnet A does change the measurement at magnet B.
However, the two measurements are close to simultane-
ous, as the two electrons have the same speed. So, there
is no time for any information from A to reach B in the
available interval.
This, said EPR, was proof that either quantum me-
chanics violated the principle, that nothing is faster than
the speed of light, or that there was additional informa-
tion, which was not contained in the wavefunction and
which made the two measurements related.
This problem has now been solved within the model of
extended electrons, the solution was recently published
[9]. The correct answer is that each electron will carry
a phase information, which is revealed at the moment
of measurement and which connects the two measure-
ment events. The same is true for photons. So wave-
functions do indeed contain additional information, their
phase, which is not considered a physical property in
standard quantum mechanics, but nevertheless included
in the mathematical description of the problem. The ad-
ditional information EPR referred to was there all along,
but not considered as such.
Bohr, of course, did not know this when he answered
that Einsteins arguments ”would hardly seem suited to
affect the soundness of quantum-mechanical description,
which is based on a coherent mathematical formalism
covering automatically any procedure of measurement
like that indicated” [2]. And, of course, reality ”must
be founded on a direct appeal to experiments and mea-
surements” [2]. This statement is the statement of a cre-
ationist. It is helpful to first analyse the main compo-
nents of the statement, and then translate the statement
into another language to see the problem.
From the viewpoint of a logical analysis, two terms
are problematic in the first sentence. These two terms
are ”coherent” and ”automatic”. What they indicate,
without any formal proof, is that a mathematical con-
struct exists, quantum mechanics, which is a comprehen-
sive description of reality (this is what coherent implies),
and that this construct inevitably leads to all possible
measurements one can think of (this is the meaning of
the word automatically). Apart from the quite stunning
arrogance of the sentence, considering the development
of experimental methods since Bohr’s statement, which
have nothing to do with the experiments which could
be undertaken in 1935 (the electron microscope, for ex-
ample, was only invented in 1936), this statement is not
science, but close to religion, as a translation into another
language reveals.
Assume that this is not the statement of a physicist,
but a novelist, who claims that her book is ”a coherent
story of the world which covers automatically every pos-
sible future, humans can experience.” If you ask yourself
what sort of book this would be then you reach the con-
clusion that it probably is not a scientific textbook of
any discipline, but rather the Holy Book of one of the
great religions, the Bible, or the Quran, for example. So
Bohr claimed, to be clear about this point, that a math-
ematical construct would, for all eternity, be a correct
description of all possible aspects of reality in physics.
And then he went even further.
”Indeed, the finite interaction between object and mea-
suring agencies conditioned by the very existence of the
quantum of action entails - because of the impossibility
of controlling the reaction of the object on the measur-
ing instruments ... the necessity of a final renunciation
of the classical ideal of causality and a radical revision
of our attitude towards the problem of physical reality”
[2]. Let us forget for a moment that causality is and has
been a fundamental principle of all sciences for at least
three hundred years. Because this is, where Bohr falls
foul even of his own Copenhagen interpretation. One of
the key statements of this interpretation is captured in
the two sentences: ”It is wrong to think that the task of
physics is to find out how Nature is. Physics concerns
what we say about Nature” [10]. But if this is the case
then a ”renunciation of causality” is not possible, be-
cause it would explicitly say that there are no causes in
Nature. If this is not possible, then the question remains
why there are no causes in quantum mechanics. This will
be the topic of the next two sections.
To sum up this section, Bohr’s reply to EPR is not
only outdated today because the EPR problem has been
solved by a causal model in real space. It also contains
dodgy logic if compared to his own Copenhagen inter-
pretation, is based on creationism when it assumes that
a mathematical construct generates all aspects of reality,
and contains assertions which are clearly not science, but
religion. I suggest we bury his statements in the history
books and get on with the science.
Einstein’s view, by contrast, that quantum mechan-
ics is an incomplete theory of atomic physics is vindi-
cated. But the omission goes far beyond what even Ein-
stein thought. It does not concern single elements of
reality, which are missing in quantum mechanics, but a
whole class of physical objects, which would allow to re-
fer events in real space to physical causes. We shall see,
how this works in practice in the next sections, but the
4final score sheet of the Bohr-Einstein controversy then
reads: Einstein one, Bohr nil.
IV. THE CASE AGAINST WAVEFUNCTIONS
One has to be very clear what wavefunctions are, and
what they are not. They are not, as Schro¨dinger thought
initially, physical objects in real space like electromag-
netic fields. This seems sometimes confusing, because the
formalism looks very similar to the formalism in Electro-
dynamics, in particular if the wavefunction is written as
a function of location, like ψ (r). There is a simple way
to distinguish physical objects in space from mathemati-
cal objects, and the key question to differentiate is: Does
this object contain energy? Every electromagnetic field
contains energy, as does mass via the energy-mass rela-
tions. The wavefunction, by contrast, does not contain
energy. Therefore it is not a physical object in space, but
a mathematical object. This is very clear in the abstract
formalism, where wavefunctions are objects in their own
mathematical space, Hilbert space.
There are two fundamental problems with wavefunc-
tions. The first problem is widely recognized in the com-
munity, and it has refused to go away, despite years of
hard work by a large number of theoretical physicist. The
second problem, which has not been recognized at all so
far, is probably the much more important one. These
two problems, combined, make wavefunctions not only
contradictory entities, but elements of creationism.
The first problem is called the measurement problem
and considered by physicists who really think hard about
their science one of the fundamental problems in modern
physics. The publications and various attempts to solve
it are well documented in the literature, and the num-
ber of articles trying to account for it probably goes into
the thousands. The problem is due to the fact that in a
measurement the wavefunction is thought to collapse to
its measured state. While this can be stated, it cannot
be described consistently in the mathematical framework
of quantum mechanics. There is, fundamentally, nei-
ther a cause, nor a physical model which would describe
how this happens. This problem has led to increasingly
weirder speculations about the relationship between the
act of measurement, and physical reality, the weirdest
one probably the assumption that every measurement
creates a new universe. Physicists of this persuasion no
longer talk about reality or the universe, but a multiverse
which, according to some estimates, contains about 10100
universes. For an engineer this would probably indicate
that physicists have lost their mind and that they are
hallucinating weirder and weirder theories to account for
a problem that their science seems incapable of solving.
But the problem can actually be turned on its head by
two simple question: What if there is no collapse? How
do I measure what I measure without a collapse? My
colleague Thomas Pope and I have developed a model of
spin measurements based on these two questions, and it
turns out that the problem can be solved with two simple
assumptions: (1) The electron is an extended object in
space, and (2) a magnetic field rotates the spin of elec-
trons, which turns out to be a vector field. The solution
has recently been published and presented at various con-
ferences in 2017 [9]. This solves the first problem, and it
shows that not the wavefunctions, but the densities are
the crucial physical variables leading to a solution.
The second problem, which so far has been completely
ignored, is the following little equation, which is due to
Max Born [11] (I ignore the various physical units that
will usually be added):
ψ† (r)ψ (r) = ρ (r) (1)
Let us be clear about the meaning of this equation.
The two objects on the left, the wavefunction and its
dual, do not contain energy, they are objects in math-
ematical space. The object on the right, the density of
electrons, contains energy, because electrons have mass,
and it is an element not of mathematical space, but of
real space. So this equation says that one can take two
elements of mathematical space, multiply them, and one
creates an object in real space which contains energy. Ev-
ery time, says the equation, a theoretical physicist takes
the square of the wavefunction, energy magically pops
out of Hilbert space and appears in real space. This is,
without doubt, creationism in its purest form.
Now a traditionalist might try, at this point, to stall
the analysis by claiming that the density is not really
a physical object, because, after all, it only shows up
in statistics. This might have been a valid argument in
1935, but it is no longer relevant in 2018. There are two
reasons for this change. The first is that every year thirty
thousand scientific papers are published which are based
on a theoretical method called density functional theory
(DFT) [12]. In DFT the only physical variable, which
determines all physical properties of an atomic scale sys-
tem is the density of electrons. This firmly roots the
density in real space and as a continuous variable. The
second reason is that density itself cannot be a statistical
property, because this assumption is in conflict with high-
precision experiments on metal surfaces, as shown in 2012
[13]. The electron density, not the wavefunction, is the
primary physical variable of atomic scale systems. And
it is a physical object in real space, not a mathematical
object in Hilbert space. So the conclusion remains: the
equation describes an impossible relationship of mathe-
matical objects in Hilbert space and physical objects in
real space. It is creationism, not science.
The measurement problem, which also is a fundamen-
tal obstacle to understanding what happens in atomic
scale systems and within the framework of quantum me-
chanics, can be ignored for most applications of the the-
ory, by following Mermin’s recipe to shut up and calcu-
late. This problem, however, cannot be ignored. Because
it says, in a nutshell, that quantum mechanics is funda-
mentally not a causal theory. Not because there are no
5causes in Nature, which is what Bohr had tried to argue,
but because at the point where one commonly expects a
cause in a theoretical framework, one gets a mathemati-
cal object in Hilbert space.
Within the standard framework, and contrary to the
framework of DFT, there is no cause that would make
the density attain a particular value. This problem, it
turns out, is not only unsolvable, it also makes quan-
tum mechanics unscientific. Creationism is not science,
rather the opposite, whether this is within the context of
a religion, or within the context of mathematics.
V. THE CASE AGAINST SPIN
The spin angular momentum, or spin as I will call it in
this section, is probably the most difficult concept intro-
duced in quantum mechanics. The difficulty arises from
the fact that it cannot in any way be captured by an im-
age in real space. The usual image, a vector which points
up or down, which is used in many scientific papers, does
not do it justice, as spin is isotropic in the absence of a
measurement, therefore not a vector. The problem, in a
nutshell, is the following.
In a Stern-Gerlach experiment silver atoms are de-
tected after an inhomogeneous magnetic field at two dis-
tinct points: one point off centre in the direction of higher
field strength, one point in the direction of lower field
strength[14]. The result indicates that the outermost
electron of a silver atom has exactly two possible mag-
netic dipoles, none of them due to the electron orbit.
The original experiments were done with silver atoms,
but were later repeated with hydrogen atoms with iden-
tical results. What actually happens to the electron in
silver or hydrogen has until recently been unknown and
it poses quite an interesting logical challenge. Assume
that the electron’s magnetic dipole points in a particular
direction, and assume that it is random, then the experi-
mental result must be an extended blob. One could now
assume, that the direction is not random, but that one
class of electrons has a vector which points up, another
class has a vector which points down. This would agree
with the experiments.
But if the magnet, which determines the trajectory of
the atoms, is turned by a quarter rotation, one would
measure the exact same result: two points where the
atoms impinge on the detection plate, now the points
are offset left and right. If the vectors have a particular
direction, then every possible direction would make the
experimental results different for different rotations of the
magnet. This means the vector cannot have a particu-
lar direction. Since it is a fundamental property of every
vector that it points into a specific direction, a vector
which does not point into a specific direction is a contra-
diction: so whatever determines the magnetic properties
of a hydrogen electron is not a vector, but isotropic. So
the electron seems to have a magnetic dipole, which is not
only not a vector, but a magnetic dipole which only ex-
presses itself as a vector if it is measured. Both problems
have remained profound difficulties for the understanding
of the electron until very recently.
The main problem becomes obvious if one asks a simple
question: What pushes the silver atom up (down)? The
only answer to this question, which is physically possible,
is: A magnetic moment, which interacts with the inho-
mogeneous field of the magnet. But as spin is isotropic, it
cannot be a magnetic moment which is a vector. There-
fore one has to ask, how an isotropic object becomes a
vector, and by what physical process? Described in this
way it is obvious that there is no physical process. In-
stead, there is a similar transformation from mathemat-
ical space to real space and from a mathematical object
to a physical one. Only in this case it does not involve,
as it did for wavefunctions and densities, the creation of
energy from Hilbert space, but the creation of a mag-
netic moment from Hilbert space. In the Pauli equation
the relevant term which accomplishes this creation is the
so called Stern-Gerlach term [15] (the last term on the
right).
ih¯
∂
∂t
|ψ〉 =
(
(p− qA)
2
2m
− qφ
)
I|ψ〉 −
qh¯
2m
σB|ψ〉 (2)
Again, there is no physical cause for the magnetic mo-
ment to have a particular direction, there only is a math-
ematical object with the necessary properties, in this case
a Hermitian matrix of a two-dimensional Hilbert space,
which accomplishes the transformation. It is, fundamen-
tally, an act of vector-creation from Hilbert space.
One can trace back the logical difficulty to account for
these measurements to a single property, tacitly assumed
in all of quantum mechanics: the assumption that elec-
trons are point particles [16]. If the electron is a point,
then its spin cannot be a vector, because it would have to
point into one specific direction. If, however, the electron
is an extended object, then spin can be a vector, or rather
a vector field. In this case it can also be an isotropic vec-
tor field, for example pointing into the radial direction of
a sphere. Then the question what pushes the silver atom
up or down, is easy to answer: the rotation of the vector
field into the direction of the magnetic field vector. Such
a process automatically aligns the spin direction with the
direction of the external magnetic field, and it will lead
to trajectories which are influenced by the field gradient.
The model has recently been introduced and it has been
shown that it is free of the usual paradoxes [9].
To sum up the result of this section we find that ac-
counting for spin measurements in quantum mechanics
also entails an act of creation, the creation of a vector
from a Hermitian matrix in Hilbert space. Again, this is
creationism and not science.
6VI. THE CASE AGAINST BOHM
On the face of it, the antagonism against Bohm’s refor-
mulation of the Schro¨dinger equation in the 1950s seems
quite stunning [17]. Because all he really did, was to
rewrite the Schro¨dinger equation using a particular form
of a wavefunction ψ = R exp (iS/h¯), where both R and
S are real-valued variables. This decouples the real and
the imaginary components of the Schro¨dinger equation.
If one now compares the real part of the equation with
the Hamilton-Jacobi equation of classical mechanics, one
finds an additional potential, which is commonly called
the quantum potential Q [18]:
∂S
∂t
= −
[
|∇S|
2
2m
+ V +Q
]
Q = −
h¯2
2m
∇2R
R
(3)
It has the dimension of a potential like the electro-
static potential V . Contrary to a conventional poten-
tial like V it does not depend on the physical environ-
ment of an electron, but on the shape of its wavefunction
via the second derivative of the amplitude R. Note that
at this point the equations Bohm derived are not differ-
ent from the original Schro¨dinger equation, because they
have been obtained by a general ansatz for the complex
valued wavefunction ψ, and a simple analysis of the real
and imaginary parts of the ensuing equations. The imag-
inary part can be linked to the continuity equation.
There is quite a large community of physicists who
consider themselves Bohmians, and it is indeed tempting
to assume that all that makes quantum mechanics differ-
ent from, say, classical mechanics, is a special potential
which only shows up in atomic scale systems. Since this
picture is, intuitively, much more satisfying than simply
following the agreed recipe and calculating things with-
out being able to picture them in the mind, it is hard to
reject out of hand. However, if one accepts that this po-
tential is what makes quantum mechanics different from
our everyday environment, then one will have to accept
the properties of the potential also as something which
belongs to the quantum domain and is not found in an
everyday environment. This is, where things become dif-
ficult intellectually.
The first problem arises, if one considers the elements
which make up the quantum potential Q. A potential,
which changes the energy content of space where it ex-
ists, is always a physical object in real space. This is,
why Bohm originally called his theory the ”causal” in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics. The point-like elec-
tron, he thought, would change its trajectory according
to the value of the potential. However, the components
making up the potential are the amplitude of the wave-
function and its derivative. The wavefunction is, as al-
ready emphasized in previous sections, not an element of
real space, but an element of mathematical space, Hilbert
space, and it does not contain any energy. So the first
problem is again a problem of creationism: the potential
is created from elements of mathematical space, energy
magically pops out of Hilbert space and into real space.
This is not the only problem, though.
Because the relationship between the amplitude of the
wavefunction and the quantum potential means that this
potential exists throughout the whole space, where the
wavefunction exists, and it will change immediately if,
for example, the physical environment changes at one
point of the system. The wavefunction then will not only
change at this point but, via the second derivative and
the normalization contained in the quantum potential,
it will change throughout the system. Bohm’s quantum
potential is also non-local. If one now thinks of interac-
tions between electrons via electromagnetic fields, then
the electromagnetic fields will only interact with elec-
trons to the extent that they have time to propagate to
the point of interaction. The quantum potential, how-
ever, will interact with an electron instantly.
So while on the one hand the image that a special po-
tential is what makes quantum mechanical systems dif-
ferent from other physical systems is intellectually sat-
isfying, it is on the other hand hard to accept that in
this case one will have to give up causality, because this
potential is created from mathematical space and there
is no physical mechanism which would allow me to un-
derstand how this quantum potential actually operates
in space. Bohm’s reformulation of the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion leads to exactly the same problem as in the original
theory: there are no causes.
This could be the endpoint of the analysis and one
could then conclude that Bohm’s theory is probably not
a way to regain causality in quantum mechanics. But
one could also go one step further. If it is accepted that
Bohm’s theory is non-local and a-causal, then one could
ask what this means for the original theory described by
the Schro¨dinger equation. Formally, Bohm’s equations
are not different from the original equation, because his
ansatz for the wavefunction is generally valid.
It is then hard to see how one set of equations makes
a theory manifestly non-local, while the logically equiv-
alent set of equations does not have this deficiency. So
the question remains: Is wave mechanics itself non-local?
Tentatively, I would suggest that the answer to this ques-
tion is yes. Then one has to understand where this
non-locality would come into the original theory. The
best candidate, I think, for this is the fact that one
obtains physical properties of electrons, which are con-
sidered point particles in the conventional theory, only
if the operator equations are integrated over the whole
space of the wavefunction. So, for example, for the hy-
drogen electron this means an integration over infinite
space, since the wavefunction exists as an exponentially
decaying function over the whole space. I suggest that
this procedure, the integration over infinite space, makes
wave mechanics as non-local as Bohm’s theory, where
non-locality is made explicit in the form of the quantum
potential. It is understood that non-locality also makes
a theory a-causal. If this argument is correct, then what
7Bohm did was not to invent a new theory which would
allow us to better understand atomic scale systems, he
rather revealed that there is no way one can make quan-
tum mechanics a framework based on causality.
VII. PREDICTIONS AND CORRELATIONS
If there are no causes in quantum mechanics and if all
physical effects are created from mathematical objects,
that is elements of the mathematical language, what does
this entail for the science described by quantum mechan-
ics? A brief recourse to history will make it clear.
During Galilei’s lifetime the conventional wisdom in
astronomy was that the solar planets move around the
Earth on trajectories described by epicycles on top of cir-
cles. The observations of Mars, for example, would show
exactly such a behaviour. Also in this case the physical
cause for its motion was unknown. So the mathemati-
cal model did not connect physical causes with physical
effects, it connected mathematical objects (circles) with
physical effects. Logically, what this theory describes is
not a set of mathematically formulated predictions how
the planet moves, but only a correlation between an ob-
servation (the position of the planet) and a mathematical
model (circles). One part of the astronomical data could
have, even before Kepler’s observations, given away the
fact that all was not well with epicycles, and this part
concerned the velocities of planets along their trajecto-
ries, which were not constant. In atomic physics, the
change of the wavelength of electrons as they change their
velocity is also a fact that remained unexplained in quan-
tum mechanics and could have alerted physicists long ago
that all was not well in theoretical physics.
Predictions can only be made, if a mathematical model
relates a physical cause to motion or other physical ef-
fects, and hence observations. Only Newton’s theory of
gravitation, which provided these causes forty years after
Galilei’s death, is capable of making these predictions.
The same applies to quantum mechanics. The mathe-
matical models do not connect physical causes to phys-
ical effects, because there are no physical causes. The
theory is therefore in principle unable to make predic-
tions. All it provides are correlations between mathemat-
ical models and experimental observations. Historically,
it involved the invention of mathematical objects to ac-
count for experiments. First, the invention of matrices
in Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics, then the invention of
wavefunctions and spins in wavemechanics. Not one of
these objects is a physical object in real space. A similar
case in point, to be analysed in the future, will prob-
ably be provided by particle physics, which was forced
to add a plethora of new mathematical elements, called
particles, as the experiments progressed. Given that it
is always possible to add new mathematical elements to
the description if a model is not in line with observations,
there is also no way to falsify such a theory. Quantum
mechanics would, logically speaking, also fail Popper’s
test for a valid scientific theory.
Quantum mechanics, in short, is not science.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The inevitable conclusion from the analysis in the pre-
ceding sections is that a major part of modern physics,
quantum mechanics, is creationism, in principle not fal-
sifiable, and not science. This generates an interesting
set of problems for theoretical physicists. One way to
deal with the problems is to ignore the findings and to
try to discredit the author of the paper. This is, what
the establishment in physics did rather successfully with
David Bohm, and it is probably safe to say that this will
be the first reaction.
But will theoretical physicists be able to keep a straight
face and the necessary authoritative demeanor when they
teach quantum mechanics 101 in the future? Will they
be able to stifle a snigger when they write down Born’s
equation or multiply a Pauli matrix with a field vector
to obtain a magnetic moment? Not to mention the awk-
ward possibility that students might start to call their
Physics professors colloquially professors of Creationism,
and rightly so. If this situation is already quite diffi-
cult to handle for a real scientist, the second problem
is even worse. Because what will biologists think, who
had to fight against creationism ever since Charles Dar-
win published his book? One can predict that physics,
as a science, will lose much of the respect it currently en-
joys in the scientific community. This leads to the third
problem, which is finding a way to make physics a real
science again. Here, the question is how much will have
to be changed, and how much of the current conventional
wisdom will have to be discarded for a future, strictly sci-
entific, physics.
There is, unfortunately, no easy way out. The whole
problem of creationism should have been addressed
eighty years ago and not swept under the carpet by the
faithful followers of Bohr. It should never have been al-
lowed to fester and to impact on all subsequent theory.
An interesting question, which historians might want
to investigate, is how much of the analysis in the current
article had been understood by Bohr himself. And if
he understood the consequences, how did he think that
a lack of causes could lead to a theory which describes
physical effects in a scientific manner? How did he think
he could keep divine mathematical interventions at bay
which, as shown here, permeate the very foundations of
the theoretical framework? My suspicion is that, in the
end, it might come down to nothing more than personal
arrogance, a lack of scientific humility, and a conviction
to always be right.
For me the most frightening aspect of this analysis is
what it says about us physicists. If quantum mechanics,
which is one of the corner stones of modern physics, is
actually not science but creationism, then how can we
justify teaching our students the same nonsense? What
8they signed up to, when they entered University, was to
get an education in a science discipline which gives them
the expertise to understand and to work with the real-
ity they are living in. Teaching them creationism, and
calling it science, is irresponsible. So I would urge all
of my colleagues in theoretical physics to analyse their
own field along the same lines. Not by mindlessly heap-
ing mathematical symbols onto a whiteboard and then,
at some point, magically finding physical objects, but
by analysing whether what their theory does is actually
compatible with the laws of causality. If it is not, it has
no place in science. My feeling is that this will proba-
bly apply to most of modern physics, not just quantum
mechanics. Time, I would think, for a big bonfire of the-
oretical tradition.
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